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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a matter of regret that unlike the business men on the continent of Eu-
rope, or even England, the American business man is, in the great majority of
cases, practically forced today to choose between only two forms: the common
law partnership and the corporation.1
Colorado2 and Kansas3 are the latest of four states to enact legisla-
tion permitting creation of a new business entity known as the Lim-
ited Liability Company ("LLC"), the other states being Florida4 and
Wyoming5. The drafters of this legislation expressly intended to pro-
vide business planners with an alternative to corporations and part-
nerships.6 Typically, business planners focus on two considerations
when deciding how to organize a business: The applicable nontax
state law; and the income tax treatment of the business form chosen.
For small business enterprises, the LLC possesses the best of both
worlds because it combines the attractive limited liability feature of
corporations with the income tax advantages of partnership classifica-
tion. In addition, LLCs are more flexible than S corporations in ac-
comodating various forms of ownership.7
While it is imperative that a business planner considering the LLC
be familiarized with such advantages, a detailed discussion of the in-
come tax advantages of partnership taxation is beyond the scope of
this Comment.8 Rather, following this introduction, Part II acquaints
the reader with the more prominent provisions of the existing LLC
1. Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 718 (1917).
William Draper Lewis, Chairman of the committee of the National Conference of
Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, was writing in support of the adoption of
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of which he was a draftsman.
2. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to 7-80-913 (Supp. 1990).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to 17-7651 (Supp. 1990).
4. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.401 to 608.471 (Supp. 1990).
5. WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to 17-15-136 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Memorandum from Alson P. Martin to the Economic Development
Committee (Feb. 28, 1990)(discussing proposed changes to Kansas H.B. 3064)
[hereinafter Martin Memorandum].
7. To be eligible for S corporation treatment, a corporation may not have more than
35 shareholders, may not have shareholders who are nonresident aliens, corpora-
tions, or certain artificial entities, may not own a controlling interest in any other
corporation, and may not have issued more than one class of stock (except for
classes of common stock that differ only in voting rights.) See I.RC. § 1361 (b)(1)
(West 1990).
8. Historically, the disparity between corporate and individual income tax rates has
been a consideration in selecting a business entity. However, recent changes in
the federal tax rates have all but eliminated tax rates as a consideration. Simi-
larly, legislative changes have removed many of the tax advantages bestowed on
corporations in the area of fringe benefits. Despite these changes, corporations
and partnerships still differ fundamentally because corporations pay taxes and
partnerships do not. For a thorough analysis of that and other tax advantages of
partnership classification, see A. WILLIs, J. PENNEL, & P. POSTELWAITE, PART-
NERSHIP TAXATION (3d ed. 1981).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
legislation. Next, Part III addresses the criteria used to establish part-
nership status for federal income tax purposes, and recent success in
securing that status for LLCs. While the LLC's pass-through taxation
is virtually assured, concern persists about whether other states will
respect its other chief characteristic, limited liability. Part IV analyzes
past policy objections expressed by courts when denying other entities
limited liability, and explains how subsequent changes in the laws of
corporations and limited partnerships should render those objections
obsolete as they pertain to LLCs.
H. THE LLC'S NONTAX STATE LAW PROVISIONS
The LLC is the most recent product of state experimentation with
business forms. Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania have
long provided for the formation of a "partnership association" or a
"limited partnership association" which, like the LLC, combines lim-
ited liability with a partnership-like operational regime.9 However,
numerous restrictions have burdened those business forms, limiting
their appeal to investors.10 No comparable restrictions weaken the
LLC. Rather, it is essentially a hybrid of existing state laws governing
the close corporation and the limited partnership.
Because the LLC borrows most of its statutory language, business
planners will benefit from a vast body of authority interpreting its
provisions in their original corporate or partnership form. Where stat-
utory language is unique, the language itself will obviously govern.
The following discussion is a summary of the LLC's statutory provi-
sions, including those governing formation, management, finance and
dissolution.
A. Formation
Formation of a LLC, like formation of a partnership, requires two
or more persons." The definition of "persons" is generous and in-
cludes "individuals, general partnerships, limited partnerships, lim-
ited liability companies, corporations, trusts, business trusts, real
9. MicH. LAws ANN. § 449.301 (1990); N.J. REV. STAT. § 42:3-1 (1990); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 1783.01 (Anderson 1985); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 12701 (1990).
10. The primary defect appears to be a requirement that either the association's prin-
cipal place of business or its principal office be maintained in the state of organi-
zation. Accordingly, if the association maintains no, or only limited, operations in
the state of organization, its members may lose the protection of limited liability.
See Burke & Sessions, The Wyoming Limited Liability Company: An Alterna.
tive to Sub S and Limited Partnerships? 54 J. TAx'N 232, 233 (1982).
11. FLA. STAT. § 608.405 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7605 (Supp. 1990); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-106 (1977). Wbile Colorado allows a single person, who need not be
a member of the LLC, to organize an LLC, the LLC must have two or more
members at time of formation, and thereafter. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-80-102(7), -
203 (Supp. 1990).
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estate investment trusts, estates and other associations."' 2 That broad
definition is a distinct advantage over the S Corporation which only
allows United States citizens, resident aliens and certain estates and
trusts to be shareholders.13 Moreover, S Corporations can only have
thirty five shareholders.14
Formation of a LLC can be a relatively simple matter. The or-
ganizers need only deliver articles of organization ("Articles") that
conform to the requirements of the act to the secretary of state. To
conform, the Articles must contain information similar to that re-
quired in most states of corporations and limited partnerships,' 5
including-
1. The name of the LLC (which must contain some form of the words "limited
liability company" or an abbreviation of those words).16
2. The period of duration (which may not exceed 30 years from the date of the
filing of the Articles).17
3. The purpose for which the LLC is organized.18
4. The address of its place of business in the state of organization, and the
name and address of its initial registered agent in the state.19
5. The total contributions (with a description and agreed value of property
other than cash contributed), and the total additional contributions, if any,
agreed to be made by all members (with the times or the events whereupon
they will be made).20
12. See, eg., WYo. STAT. § 17-15-102(a)(iv)(1977).
13. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(a)(West 1990).
14. I&
15. Historically, many of the provisions required to appear in the articles of incorpo-
ration were designed either to notify creditors of the risk they assumed by deal-
ing with a limited liability enterprise, or to aid creditors in reaching corporate
assets. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L.
REv. 259, 268-69 (1967). For corporations those provisions cease to have any real
importance. I& at 268. However, they may provide some level of comfort to credi-
tors unfamiliar with the LLC form of business at least while that business form is
in its infancy. Furthermore, public disclosure gives the appearance of notice
which may be helpful in sustaining the separate-entity status in foreign
jurisdictions.
16. CoiO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(a)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(a)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(i)
(1977).
17. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(b)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(b)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(2)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(ii)
(1977).
18. FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(c)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(3) (Supp.
1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(iii)(1977). In Colorado, disclosure of the LLC's
purpose is optional, similar to corporation laws. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-
204(1)(e)(Supp. 1990). See REVISED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. Acr § 2.02(b)(2)(i)
(1985).
19. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-204(1)(d)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(d)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(4)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-
107(a)(iv)(1977).
20. FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(e)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(5)-(6)
(Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(v)(1977). Colorado does not require such
a disclosure in the Articles, but does require that that information be retained as
1991]
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6. The right, if given, of the members to admit additional members (with the
terms and conditions of admission).2 1
7. The right, if given, of the remaining members to continue the business fol-
lowing occurrence of one of the events causing dissolution.2 2
8. An election to be maneged either by the members (with the names and
addresses of the members) or by a manager or managers (with a statement
that the company is to be managed by a manager or managers, and the
names and addresses of the initial managers).2 3
If the Articles conform to law, the secretary of state will file them
and issue a certificate of organization.2 4 The date of filing marks the
beginning of the LLC's legal existence, 25 with the certificate of organi-
zation as conclusive evidence.26 Persons taking action on behalf of the
LLC before that date, other than business incidental to organization
or to obtaining subscriptions for or payment of contributions, may be
personally liable because they lack the authority to bind the LLC.27
part of the LLC records. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-411(1)(f)(I)(Supp. 1990). See
also REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 105(a)(5)(1985).
21. FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(g)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(7)(Supp.
1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(vii)(1977). The Colorado statute provides for ad-
mission of additional members "upon written consent of all members." CoLO.
REv. STAT. § 7-80-701 (Supp. 1990). Thus, the Articles of a Colorado LLC need
not mention this matter.
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(h)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(8)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-
107(a)(viii)(1977).
23. FLA. STAT. § 608.407(1)(i)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7607(a)(9)(Supp.
1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(ix)(1977). This requirement puts third parties
on notice that managers have authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the
LLC. August and Shaw, The Limited Liability Company - A New Tax Refuge?,
J. TAX'N INVESTMENTS 179,191 (1990). But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp.
1990). Because Colorado mandates the election of managers, the Articles need no
statement of election. See CLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-203 (Supp. 1990).
24. CLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-207(1)(b)(Supp. 1990)(secretary of state returns an en-
dorsed duplicate copy of Articles, rather than a certificate of organization); FLA.
STAT. § 608.408 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7608 (Supp. 1-90); Wyo. STAT.
§ 17-15-108 (1977).
25. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-207 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.409 (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7609 (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-109 (1977). With the ex-
ception of Wyoming the statutes allow the date of formation to relate back to an
earlier date. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-207 (Supp. 1990)(date organizers deliver the
Articles unless specified otherwise in the Articles); FLA. STAT. § 608.409(3)(a)
(Supp. 1990)(date of subscription and acknowledgment if specified in Articles and
if filed within 5 days, exclusive of legal holidays, of such date); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7609(c)(1)(Supp. 1990)(date of subscription if specified in Articles and if filed
within five days, exclusive of legal holidays, of such date). Moreover, those same
states provide that organizers may delay the date of commencement up to 90 days
of filing by express provision of the Articles. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 740-207 (Supp.
1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.409(3)(b)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7609(c)(2)(Supp. 1990).
26. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-207(1)(b)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.409(1)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7609(a)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-109 (1977).
27. Of the four states with LLC statutes, only Colorado grants limited liability to
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However, the simplicity of the organizational process reduces the
probability of such an event.28
B. Management
Once organized, the LLC may conduct business for a broad range
of purposes.29 The LLC is a legally distinct entity, with powers nearly
persons who act with an honest, but erroneous belief that they had authority to do
so. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-105 (Supp. 1990) with FLA. STAT. § 608.437
(Supp. 1990) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7621 (Supp. 1990) and WYO. STAT. § 17-15-
133 (1977). Because LLCs are so simple to organize, perhaps the drafters felt
nothing short of filing the Articles should merit the privilege of limited liability.
A possible reason for Colorado's departure from the other LLC statutes is that a
Colorado LLC's legal existence may relate back to the date of delivery of the
Articles to the secretary of state. See suprm note 25. Perhaps the Colorado legis-
lature felt that the "good faith belief" standard was necessary to avoid imposing
too harsh a penalty on those who transacted business between the date of deliv-
ery and the date of filing.
Despite the clear language embodied in the stricter provisions, persons con-
ducting preorganization activities may nevertheless be shielded from personal lia-
bility under certain circumstances. Their fate rests primarily on the degree to
which the state courts choose to borrow interpretation from parallel corporation
and partnership provisions, and the court's interpretation of those provisions in
that jurisdiction. In states with similar corporation provisions courts have contin-
ued to apply the common law concepts of "de facto corporations, de jure corpora-
tions, and corporations by estoppel that provide protection against liability for
preincorporation transactions." REVISED MODEL BusINEsS CORP. ACT § 2.04, Of-
ficial Comment (1985). But see Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443,449 (1964) (court
interpreted District of Columbia code as rejecting de facto corporations and cor-
porations by estoppel).
States adopting section 2.04 provide statutory relief by imposing personal lia-
bility only where persons purport to act for the corporation, "knowing there was
no incorporation." REVISED MODEL BuSINEss CORP. ACT § 2.04 (1985). And of
course, protection has long been accorded persons who contribute capital to a
partnership erroneously believing a limited partnership certificate has been filed.
UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 12 (1916); REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHP ACT
§ 3.04 (1985). Even if the courts read the stricter LLC provisions narrowly sO as
to impose personal liability, the members presumably could vote to ratify and
accept the acts of the organizer who acted for the LLC before it was legally in
existence.
28. A virtual elimination of problems stemming from mistakes in the incorporation
process is attributable to its standardization and simplification. Meiners, Mofsky,
and Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 354
(1979).
29. Florida, Kansas, and Wyoming have adopted the "for any lawful purpose" lan-
guage commonly found in state corporation acts. FLA. STAT. § 608.403 (Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7603 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-103 (1977).
However, those states have qualified that language by restricting LLCs from en-
gaging in certain state regulated activities in the same manner that partnerships
are restricted. Colorado, on the other hand, allows LLCs to operate "any busi-
ness that a partnership with limited partners may lawfully conduct." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-80-103 (Supp. 1990). That language is modeled after the Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act (RULPA) and is intended to allow states to pro-
1991]
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identical to a corporation.3o In addition to the Articles, members may
adopt regulations (bylaws in Kansas) and an operating agreement to
govern the internal affairs of the business. Typically, those documents
will contain the same guidelines and information found in the bylaws
of corporations or the operating agreement of a partnership (e.g., vot-
ing rights, notice requirements, management responsibilities, transfer
of interest restrictions). Members have ultimate control over manage-
hibit partnerships from engaging in the same regulated activities. REvISED UNIF.
LTD. PARTNERSH AcT § 106 (1985). Thus, the difference in language would ap-
pear to be more form than substance.
30. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-104 (Supp. 1990) provides that a limited liability company
organized under its law may-
(a) Sue and be sued, complain and defend, and participate in administra-
tive or other proceedings, in its name;
(b) Purchase, take, receive, lease or otherwise acquire, own, hold, im-
prove, use, and otherwise deal in and with real or personal property,
or an interest in it, wherever situated;
(c) Sell, convey, assign, encumber, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange,
transfer, and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and
assets;
(d) Lend money to and otherwise assist its members and employees, ex-
cept as otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets;
(e) Purchase, take, receive, subscribe for or otherwise acquire, own,
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dis-
pose of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other in-
terests in or obligations of other limited liability companies, domestic
or foreign corporations, associations, general or limited partnerships,
or individuals or direct or indirect obligations of the United States or
of any government, state, territory, governmental district, or munici-
pality or of any instrumentality of any of them;
(f) Make contracts and guarantees and incur liabilities, borrow money at
such rates of interest as the limited liability company may determine,
issue its notes, bonds, and other obligations, and secure any of its ob-
ligations by mortgage or pledge of all or any part of its property,
franchises, and income;
(g) Lend money for its proper purposes, invest and reinvest its funds,
and take and hold real property and personal property for the pay-
ment of funds so loaned or invested;
(h) Conduct its business, carry on its operations, and have and exercise
the powers granted by this article in any state, territory, district, or
possession of the United States or in any foreign country;
(i) Elect managers and appoint agents of the limited liability company
and define their duties and fix their compensation;
(j) Make and alter operating agreements, not inconsistent with its arti-
cles of organization or with the laws of this state, for the administra-
tion and regulation of the affairs of the limited liability company;
(k) Indemnify a member or manager or former member or manager of
the limited liability company... ;
(1) Cease its activities and surrender its certificate of organization;
(m) Have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect any
or all of the proposes for which the limited liability company is
organized;
(n) Become a member of a general partnership, limited partnership,
joint venture, or similar association or any other limited liability
company.
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ment through their power to elect managers, and by virtue of any con-
trol they choose to retain as members.
In addition, the members or managers may amend or repeal any
existing provision of the regulations or operating agreement, or adopt
new ones, provided the action taken is not inconsistent with state law
or the Articles.31 Despite these similarities, the existing LLC statutes
differ in the degree of state regulation, and accordingly in their resem-
blance to existing state corporation and partnership laws.
With the exception of the Colorado statute, each statute vests man-
agement in the members in proportion to their capital contributions, 32
unless the members choose to have centralized management.3 3 Colo-
rado mandates election of managers, but allows members to serve as
managers in the same manner as under the other three statutes. A
member who also manages may exercise control privileges similar to
general partners of a limited partnership. However, unlike the gen-
eral partner or the limited partner who participates in the control of
the business,3 4 managing members of a LLC do not risk subjecting
their personal assets to the claims of LLC creditors. Further discus-
sion of limited liability is deferred until Part IV.
Aside from management by members in proportion to their capital
contributions, each statute allows members to elect managers. Mem-
bers have broad discretion over the election process, and the degree of
authority delegated to managers,3 5 so long as they hold annual elec-
tions36 . As a means of assuring that ultimate control remains with
31. FLA. STAT. § 608.423 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990). Colo-
rado achieves the same result by granting members the power to vote on "any
matter" in similar fashion to section 302 of RULPA. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-706
(Supp. 1990). See also REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 302 (1985).
32. Commentators have expressed concern over the lack of clarity of member voting
rights, and advised that members adopt specific voting procedures in the regula-
tions or operating agreement. August & Shaw, supra note 23, at 190.
33. FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977). Those acts are silent, however, as to what percentage of
votes is necessary to approve action, leaving that question to be answered in the
regulations or operating agreement. The Colorado statute answers this question
by providing for approval by a majority of members. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-708
(Supp. 1990). However, it fails to address how voting power is to be distributed
among members. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-706 (Supp. 1990).
34. A limited partner of a limited partnership organized under the RULPA is person-
ally liable if "in addition to the exercise of his [or her] rights and powers as a
limited partner, he [or she] participates in the control of the business." REVISED
UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(a) (1985).
35. In particular, '"The manager or managers... hold the offices and have the respon-
sibilities accorded to them by the members and set out in the operating agree-
ment of the limited liability company." FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977).
36. FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1990); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977).
1991][
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members, the Florida and Kansas statutes provide that members may
repeal or alter any regulation or bylaw adopted by the managers, and
adopt new regulations or bylaws.37 Moreover, members in those states
may forbid managers from altering, amending, or repealing any regu-
lations or bylaws adopted by the members.3 8 By contrast, the Wyo-
ming statute leaves such details to be worked out by the members in
the operating agreement. That contractual, rather than regulatory,
approach closely resembles the traditional operational regime of
the partnership,39 and, in modern times, possibly of the close
corporation.40
More closely aligned with general corporation laws, the Colorado
and Kansas statutes require that management respect certain opera-
tional rules, including rules governing the meetings of members,41 no-
tice of such meetings,42 and member voting.43  Colorado further
regulates the relationship between members and managers in the fol-
lowing manner:
(1) members must elect and fix the number of managers;4 4
(2) election of managers is by a majority vote;4 5
37. FLA. STAT. § 608.423 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990).
38. FLA. STAT. § 608.423 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990).
39. See, eg., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 18 (1914)("The rights and duties of the part-
ners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them, by the following rules... ")(emphasis added).
40. See, eg., REvISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 8.01(b)(1985)("[T]he business
and affairs of the corporation [shall be] managed under the direction of the board
of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation.")
For a recent discussion of the contractual theory of corporations, see Butler, The
Contractual Theory of the Corporation, n GEo. MASON L. REv. 99 (1989).
41. COLO. REv. STAT. § 740-707 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990).
42. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-709-10 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp.
1990).
43. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-80-706, -708 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp.
1990).
44. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-80-401, -402(l)(Supp. 1990). That requirement appears to
be ill-advised when compared to close corporation statutes which have recognized
that in the close corporation setting "management and ownership are substan-
tially identical," Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, CORNELL L. Q. 488,
and have allowed shareholders to opt out of the traditional board of directors
management scheme. See, eg., REVISED MODEL BUsINESS CORP. ACT, CLOSE
CORP. SupP. § 21 (1985).
Unlike Colorado, Florida, Kansas, and Wyoming give members the option of
electing managers. FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612
(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-116 (1977). Kansas, however, mandates the se-
lection of a president and secretary at the annual meeting of the members,
whether or not a manager or managers is or are elected. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7613 (Supp. 1990). The drafters wanted to "provide a mechanism for creating a
hierarchy or division of authority among the managers." Martin Memorandum,
supra note 6.
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-402(1)(Supp. 1990).
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(3) managers owe members a statutory duty of care4 6
(4) members may remove a manager with or without cause by a majority vote
of the members (members can specify the manner of removal in the oper-
ating agreement);4 7
(5) managers may fill a manager vacancy by majority vote of the remaining
managers, and that person will serve the unexpired term of his
predecessor,4 8
(6) any manager's position created by an increased number of managers must
be filled by written agreement of a majority of managers then in office or
by election at an annual meeting of the members;
4 9
(7) managers have the sole power to execute instruments and documents pro-
viding for the acquisition, mortgage, or disposition of property of the
LLC;5 0 and
(8) except as otherwise provided by the state law, the Articles, or the operat-
ing agreement, managers have the sole power to contract for a debt or
liability by or on behalf of the LL. 51
Proponents of increased regulation typically argue that it avoids
problems if a passive investor lacks full cognition and volition about
the risks and benefits of the managers' activities.52 However, the LLC
46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-406 (Supp. 1990). That provision probably adds nothing
to the rights of members because courts would likely impose a common law fidu-
ciary duty in the same manner as they originally did for corporations. See, eg.,
Kullgren v. Navy Gas & Supply Co., 135 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1943).
47. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-405 (Supp. 1990).
48. COL REV. STAT. § 7-80-404 (Supp. 1990).
49. Id-
50. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-408 (Supp. 1990). Florida, Kansas and Wyoming grant
managers the same power if the members chose to have centralized management.
FLA. STAT. § 608.425 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7614 (Supp. 1990); WYo.
STAT. § 17-15-118 (1977). Those provisions create legal authority in managers, in
addition to their apparent authority already provided by the general rules of
agency. The drafters intended to instill confidence in third parties entering into
the specified business transactions with managers. See Comment, THE LIMITED
LIABmTY COMiPANY Acr, 11 FLA. ST. L. REV. 386, 392 (1983).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-407 (Supp. 1990). Because this provision is subject to ex-
ceptions, it will effectively operate as a default rule. In Florida and Wyoming,
where centralized management is optional, any member can bind the LLC. How-
ever, if managers are elected then they have binding power. FLA. STAT. § 608.424
(Supp. 1990); WVYO. STAT. § 17-15-117 (1977). By contrast, Kansas requires that all
written contracts of whatever type be signed by the president and secretary, or
any other officer or person designated at a properly-called meeting of the mem-
bers. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (Supp. 1990). The purpose of this requirement is
to eliminate uncertainty about who can bind the LLC. Martin Memorandum,
supra note 6. The reasoning behind the change is that "no one person should be
able to obligate the entire entity," a fact immediately distinguishing an LLC from
a partnership. Ic.
52. The Colorado statute offers further protection to the passive investor by allowing
access to certain basic LLC documents and information, including a current list of
the names and addresses of all members and managers, a copy of the Articles and
copies of income tax returns. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-411 (Supp. 1990). In addi-
tion, members are entitled to a formal accounting "whenever circumstances
render it just and reasonable." I&
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is ill-suited to serve the passive investor. 8 The passive investor usu-
ally demands the maximum possible freedom to dispose of her inter-
est.54 However, LLCs require consent of all members before all of the
attributes of ownership may be transferred,5 5 and therefore inhibit
formation of an efficient market for sale of ownership interests.5 6
While the Colorado LLC does not offer marketability, neither does
it offer liquidity. Absent forcing dissolution,57 a member's right to re-
turn of capital is severely limited. In addition to being limited to dis-
tributions that do not impair the firm's solvency, a member's right to a
distribution is conditioned on a contingent obligation to repay, similar
to partners of a limited partnership.58 A firm's ability to repay its
creditors is dependent not only on its resources available at the time
credit is extended, but also by its subsequent use of those resources
and ability to generate new resources. In order to adequately assess
these contingencies, an investor would have to monitor the entity's
business activities, a practical impossibility for the passive investor. In
short, the LLC is incapable of satisfying the passive investor, making
the increased protection offered by mandatory operational procedures
illusory.59
On the other hand, a consequence of decreased state regulation is
that the courts must pay greater attention to the duties owed by mem-
bers to each other, and by managers to members. Because there will
53. Edward J. Roche, Jr., a professor at the University of Denver College of Law and
Graduate Tax Program, chaired the group which drafted the Colorado LLC act.
Professor Roche indicated that the increased regulation adopted by the Colorado
act is not the result of considerations of the passive investor. Rather, it was in-
tended to protect creditors and others doing business with the LLC. Telephone
Interview with Professor Edward J. Roche (January 25, 1991).
54. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company. A Possible Choice for Doing Business?;
41 FLA. L. REV. 721, 747 (1989). An inability to transfer ownership interests will
likely deter investment in LLCs despite the attractiveness of limited liability be-
cause, while limited liability protects investors from the risk of insolvency, liquid-
ity or marketability of ownership interest is perhaps the most important
consideration for investors when the entity is not threatened by bankruptcy.
Manne, supra note 15, at 264.
55. See infra note 80, and accompanying text.
56. See infra section M.D. While a member may transfer her right to share in LLC
profits without consent of the other members, Hamill cautions against reliance on
free transferability of interests to assure partnership income tax status for LLCs
with many passive investors. See Hamill, supra note 54, at 747. In such situa-
tions, the Service could view the right to transfer a mere economic interest as
free transferability of interest.
57. See infra section H.D.
58. REVISED. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 608 (1985).
59. Hamill makes the point more forcefully stating- "The LLC should never be cho-
sen for ventures traditionally conducted in large limited partnerships in which
the business includes many limited partners that do not meet or communicate
regularly and in some cases are unaware of each other's identity." Hamill, supra
note 54, at 747.
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be no ready market for members to sell their interests, there will ac-
cordingly be no barometer to reflect member dissatisfaction with man-
agement decisions. Furthermore, managing members may attempt to
freeze out non-managing members with methods developed by share-
holders of close corporations. 60 For these reasons it makes little sense
to adopt the hands-off approach of the "business judgment rule," ap-
plied principally to decisions of directors of public corporations. The
better rule would be to scrutinize the decisions of managers and mem-
bers with the standard of utmost good faith and loyalty often used in
both the partnership and close corporation settings.6 1
C. Finance
None of the existing LLC statutes create unique financing provi-
sions. Florida, Kansas and Wyoming each model their provisions after
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA); Colorado simply
tracks the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA). Both
courses have the obvious advantage of avoiding much of the uncer-
tainty of judicial interpretation. As one commentator pointed out: "Its
[the LLC's] major disadvantage is its youth."6 2 Arguably then, the
closer the statutory language resembles existing provisions, the more
familiar and attractive the LLC will be to investors.
As a result of following the RULPA rather than the ULPA, the
Colorado statute's finance provisions differ somewhat from those of
the other three states. One such difference is immediately evident in
the forms of contributions available to members. Unlike the Florida,
Kansas and Wyoming statutes which limit member contributions to
cash or other personal property,63 the Colorado statute also allows
members to contribute services rendered or an obligation to contrib-
ute cash, property or services. 64 Given that most LLCs will be small
60. Of course, the LLC's partnership-like dissolution provisions greatly diminish the
threat of a freeze-out. See itnfra Part 11. Section D.
61. See, ag., Donahue v. Rodd Electrolyte Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
For an analysis of the reasons for imposing a strong fiduciary duty on sharehold-
ers of a close corporation, see Manne, supra note 15, at 281-82.
62. Comment, supra note 50, at 405.
63. FLA. STAT. § 608.421 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7617 (1990); Wyo. STAT.
§ 17-15-115 (1977).
64. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-501 (Supp. 1990). Cf REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 501 (1985). Colorado also requires the LLC to retain records describing the
property or services contributed along with an attributable value. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 7-8-411 (Supp. 1990). C. PvisE UNIF. LTD PARTNERSHIP ACT § 105
(1985).
At first glance, the opportunity to contribute services appears to give investors
added flexibility. The advantage is more perceived than real, however, because
undesirable tax consequences will likely deter members from exercising this op-
tion. See Hamill, supra note 54, at 742 n.137.
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businesses, the Colorado approach is preferable. 5 Typically, small
businesses consist of a few entrepreneurs, each with some specialized
function to perform. They do not associate simply to amass capital,
but rather to combine talents.66 An individual contributing organiza-
tional ability or some other specialized skill may be as valuable, or
more valuable, to the firm as one contributing capital. Statutory pro-
visions should reflect that reality and provide flexibility to
participants.67
Each of the statutes recognizes the need for flexibility when it
comes to return on investment. Members may allocate and distribute
profits in any manner they see fit,68 so long as the distribution does
not leave the LLC insolvent.69 When losses are incurred, the mem-
bers enjoy the favorable loss deduction rules of partnership taxation.
Partners may deduct their share of partnership losses to the extent of
their basis in the partnership,70 which is increased by their share of
the partnership's non-recourse liabilities.71 Furthermore, because
members have limited liability all LLC liabilities are non-recourse,
provided that no member assumes or guarantees a LLC debt. Conse-
quently, members are allowed to increase their basis (and not find
their loss deduction limited under section 704(d)) even though they
bear no risk of economic loss. That feature is perhaps the LLC's
strongest advantage over the S corporation which offers shareholders
no comparable means to increase their income tax basis.72
Another unique feature of the Colorado statute is its interim distri-
bution provision. That provision entitles members to withdraw a por-
65. But see Gunn, Partnership Interest for Service&- Partnership Gain and Loss?
TAX NoTEs (May 7, 1990).
66. Manne, supra note 15, at 278.
67. Members who wish to contribute services should take notice that Subchapter K
treats a partner's contribution of services as a taxable event, unlike contributions
of property. I.R.C. § 721 (West 1986).
68. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-503 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.426 (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7615 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-119 (1977). The Colorado
statute adds a default provision in the event the operating agreement is silent,
allocating profits and losses on the basis of the value of member contributions.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-503 (Supp. 1990).
69. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-606 (Supp. 1990)(no distribution if after distribution, all
liabilities, other than liabilities to members on account of membership interests,
would exceedfair value of LCC assets); FLA. STAT. § 608.426 (Supp. 1990)(distri-
bution can only be made if, after distribution, assets are in excess of all liabilities
except liabilities to members on account of their contributions); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-7615 (Supp. 1990)(same as Florida); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-119 (1977). None of
the statutes has language similar to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA) limiting distributions in cases of cash flow insolvency. See REVIsED
MODEL BuSINESS CORP. Acr § 6.40(c)(1) (1985).
70. See I.R.C. § 704(d)(West 1986).
71. See I.R.C. § 752(a)(West 1986); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(1988).
72. See I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2)(West Supp. 1990).
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tion of their capital contribution, via a provision in the operating
agreement, without the onerous notice requirements of the other
acts.1 3 Under the Florida, Kansas, and Wyoming statutes, unless the
Articles authorize the withdrawal,74 or the other members consent by
amending the Articles,75 a member can only withdraw his capital if
there is no stated time of dissolution in the Articles, and if that mem-
ber gives six months notice in writing to the other members.7 6 Colo-
rado's omission of those requirements may improve the timeliness of
distributions, but it by no means places members on equal footing with
shareholders of corporations in terms of their ability to divest. Unlike
shareholders, members who successfully withdraw contributions are
liable to the LLC for the discharge of creditors who extended credit or
whose claims arose before the withdrawal.77 The harshness of that
and the other distributional limitations mentioned earlier is exacer-
bated by restrictions placed on transferability of interests.
A member's interest is considered to be personal property,7 8 and
transferable only in the manner provided for in the operating agree-
ment.79 In addition, if the other members refuse to approve the trans-
fer by unanimous consent, the transferee obtains no right to
participate in the management of the business and affairs of the LLC
or to become a member.8 0 The transferee is only entitled to receive
the transferor's share in the profits or return of contributions.8 ' Un-
like partners of a limited partnership,8 2 members of a LLC may not
remove the transferability restriction by agreement. However, the re-
strictions are not without justification.
One reason for such a strict rule is to insure some measure of cer-
tainty that the LLC will qualify for partnership income tax classifica-
73. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-601 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.426 (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7615 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-119 (1977).
74. FLA. STAT. § 608.427(2)(b)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7616(b)(2)(Supp.
1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-120(b)(ii)(1977).
75. FLA. STAT. § 608.427(1)(b)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7616(a)(2) and (3)
(Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-120(a)(ii)(1977).
76. FLA. STAT. § 608.427(2)(c)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7616(b)(3)(Supp.
1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-120(b)(ii)(1977).
77. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-607(1) (Supp. 1990)(limited to a period of six years); FLA.
STAT. § 608.435(4)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7619(d)(Supp. 1990); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-121(d)(1977).
78. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-702(1)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.431 (Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7616 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
79. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.431 (Supp. 1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
80. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-702(1)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.432 (Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
81. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-702(1)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.432 (Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7618 (Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-122 (1977).
82. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Aar § 704(a)(1985).
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tion.s3 Not only may transferability restrictions be necessary for
LLCs if they are to obtain partnership income tax status, they will
actually be preferable for most small businesses. Participants in a
small business are genuinely interested in knowing and controlling
the identity of other participants.8 4 Indeed, shareholders of close cor-
porations often place restrictions on share transferability when stat-
utes impose none. In that light, restricting transferability can be seen
as simply an adaptation to business practice.
D. Dissolution
Similar to businesses organized under the UPA85 and RULPA,86 a
LLC dissolves when any of the following events occur.
(1) When the period fixed for the duration of the LLC expires;8 7
(2) By the unanimous written agreement of all members;8 8 or
(3) Upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or disso-
lution of a member or the occurrence of any other event which terminates
the continued membership of a member in the LLC, unless the business is
continued by consent of all the remaining members under a right to do so
stated in the Articles. 8 9
In addition to the above language, the statutes of Florida and Kan-
sas allow members to provide for a self-executing "right to continue"
the business by including such a provision in the Articles.90 That pro-
vision effectively eliminates the threat of dissolution following occur-
rence of one of the stated events, even if all the remaining members
refuse to consent to continue the business. A creditor who reviewed
an LLC's Articles prior to extending credit to the LLC might look
with favor on a "right to continue" provision. However, extended con-
tinuity of life carries with it two different problems. It adds to the
difficulties that members wishing to withdraw their interests must
83. See infra section Ill.D.
84. Manne, supra note 15, at 279.
85. UNiF. PARTNERSHmP AcT § 31 (1914).
86. REVIsED UNIF. PARTNERSBIP ACT § 801 (1985).
87. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(a)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(a)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(a)(1)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(i)
(1977).
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(b)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(b)(Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(a)(2)(Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(ii)
(1977).
89. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(c) (Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(a)(3)(Supp. 1990); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-
123(a)(iii)(1977). Colorado adds that if the remaining members choose to con-
tinue the business, they must do so within ninety days after termination. COLO.
REv. STAT. § 7-80-801(1)(c)(Supp. 1990).
90. FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(c)(Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(a)(3)(Supp.
1990). Hamill argues that this allows members the option of circumventing the
consent requirement. Hamill, supra note 54, at n.50.
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bear.9 1 But more importantly extended continuity of life might have
adverse consequences on the LLC's ability to obtain partnership in-
come tax status.92
If no "right to continue" is present and one of the stated dissolu-
tion-causing events has transpired, the LLC must execute a statement
of intent to dissolve. After the secretary of state files the statement of
intent to dissolve,9 3 the LLC must cease operations, except activities
necessary to wind up its business.94 However, similar to corporation
law,95 the state does not extinguish the LLC as a separate entity until
the secretary of state receives and files articles of dissolution.9 6
Before articles of dissolution can be executed the LLC must settle its
accounts by distributing assets in the following manner: first to credi-
tors, next to members for their share of profits and other compensa-
tion by way of income on their contributions, and finally to members
for return of capital contributions.97
III. BASIS FOR OBTAINING PARTNERSHIP
CLASSIFICATION FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PURPOSES
One of the principal advantages of the LLC is that it offers its
members pass-through income taxation. However, before an LLC can
obtain the benefits of pass-through income taxation it must first
achieve partnership classification. Until recently, uncertainty in this
area had deterred investors from choosing the LLC as a business form.
However, recent favorable rulings are sure to increase the rate of fil-
ings in the states with LLC legislation. Before those rulings can be
understood, the reader first must become familiar with the criteria
used for classifying entities as partnerships for federal income tax
purposes.
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") classifies organiza-
tions as either associationsg (which are taxable as corporations), part-
91. See supr, section H.C.
92. See supm section IM.A.
93. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-801(2)(Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.442 (Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7622(b)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-124 (1977).
94. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-804 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.443(1)(Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. A.NN. § 17-7624(a)(Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-125 (1977).
95. See REVIsED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 14.03 (1985).
96. COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-80-804 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608.443(1)(Supp. 1990);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7624(a)(Supp. 1990); WYO. STAT. § 17-15-125 (1977).
97. FLA. STAT. § 608.444 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7625 (Supp. 1990); WYO.
STAT. § 17-15-126 (1977). Colorado's statute reads differently. There, LLC assets
are distributed first to creditors, next to members in satisfaction of liabilities for
distributions, and finally for return of capital contributions. COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 7-80-805 (Supp. 1990).
98. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a)(as amended in 1983). The definition of an association
is the principle applied to Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), and
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nerships or trusts.9 Specifically, the term "partnership" for federal
income tax purposes is much broader than typical statutory defini-
tions,100 and may include a "syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or
other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not
a corporation' 0 ' or a trust or estate within the meaning of the
[Code]." 0 2
An organization will be taxed as a partnership if it is has more
characteristics of a partnership than of a corporation. 0 3 In applying
that rule, commonly known as the "resemblance test,"1 04 the Service
has identified six characteristics possessed by corporations: (1) associ-
ates, (2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains there-
from, (3) continuity of life, (4) centralization of management, (5)
limited liability, and (6) free transferability of interests.1 05 However,
because partnerships and corporations both have associates and an ob-
jective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, the Treas-
ury Regulations provide that only the remaining four characteristics
will be considered when determining partnership classification.106
includes entities resembling corporations although they are not formally organ-
ized as such.
99. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (b)(as amended in 1977).
100. Section 6 of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT provides:
(1) A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as
co-owners of a business for profit.
(2) But any association formed under any other statute of this state, or
any statute adopted by authority, other than the authority of this
state, is not a partnership under this act, unless such association
would have been a partnership in this state prior to the adoption of
this act; but this act shall apply to limited partnerships except in so
far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent
herewith.
UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6 (1914).
101. '"The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insur-
ance companies." I.R.C. § 7702 (a)(3)(West 1990).
102. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701.3(a)(as amended in 1960).
103. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(as amended in 1983). See also Morrissey v. Comm'r,
296 U.S. 344, 357 (1935)("[t]he inclusion of associations with corporations implies
resemblance; but its resemblance and not identity").
104. See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 733 (1975).
105. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(as amended in 1983). These characteristics were
first enumerated in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). In Morris-
sey, the petitioners were trustees of an express trust created for the development
of a golf course and the sale and rental of attached land. The trustees possessed
broad powers of management and control, liability was limited to trust property,
beneficial interests were freely transferable and the death of an owner of a bene-
ficial interest did not terminate the trust. In holding the trust taxable as an asso-
ciation, the Court set out its six characteristics test whereby an organization
which resembled a corporation more closely than any other type of entity would
be classified as an association for federal tax purposes. See also Zuckman v.
United States, 524 F.2d 729, 733 (1975).
106. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)(as amended in 1983).
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Specifically, an organization will be taxed as a partnership if it
lacks two of those four remaining corporate characterstics.o7 In
making its determination, the Service must take each into account,108
and give them equal weight.109 Further, the Service must consider all
the facts and circumstances of a particular case,110 and must apply
state law in determining whether these characteristics exist.'U
In addition to the substantive rules for partnership classification,
the Service has set out certain criteria which must be met before it
will consider a ruling request on partnership classification.1 2 Because
that pronouncement covers both organizations formed as partnerships
and others seeking partnership classification, an LLC must meet its
requirements before the Service will consider a ruling request.11 3 The
following discussion analyzes the requirements of that Revenue Pro-
cedure in the context of the four corporate characteristics identified in
the Treasury Regulations.114
107. Id.
108. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(as amended in 1983).
109. Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159, 172 (1976).
110. I&
111. The Treasury expressly provides that although it makes its own classification,
"local law governs in determining whether the legal relationships which have
been established in the formation of an organization are such that the standards
are met." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c)(as amended in 1977). The Treasury Regula-
tions add an example where a group of doctors agreed that neither the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, nor expulsion of a member would
cause the dissolution of the organization. The organization lacked continuity of
life, however, because local law mandated that a member who withdraws has the
power to dissolve the organization. Treas. Reg. § 30L7701-2(g) Example 2 (as
amended in 1983).
112. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1, C. B. 798.
113. Id.
114. In addition to the requirements tied to the four classification criteria, Revenue
Prococedure 89-12 imposes two preconditions on the minimum participation of
general partners in a limited partnership. If neither of these are satisfied, the
Service will not consider a ruling request for partnership classification. First,
general partners must collectively own at least a one percent (1%) interest "in
each material item of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit" if total
contributions are not greater than $50 million. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798
§ 4.01. In the unlikely event that contributions exceed that amount, the percent-
age is reduced by the ratio of $50 million divided by total contributions. Id. at
§ 4.02.
Second, the general partners must either. (1) maintain minimum capital of
the lesser of 1 percent of total positive capital or $500,000 or (2) at least one gen-
eral partner must have contributed or will contribute substantial services for
which guaranteed payment is not required. Id. at § 4.03. Partners contributing
substantial services must also agree to contribute upon dissolution and termina-
tion the lesser of: any deficit in their capital balance or the excess of 1.01 percent
of the limited partners total capital contributions over the previous capital contri-
butions by the general partners. Id. at § 4.04.
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A. Continuity of Life
The first corporate characteristic described in the Treasury Regu-
lations is continuity of life.115 An organization lacks continuity of life
if it dissolves'- 6 upon the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, res-
ignation, or expulsion of any member.1 7 The Treasury Regulations
specifically recognize that business entities organized under the UPA
or the RULPAls will always lack the corporate characteristic of con-
tinuity of life.119 Accordingly, because the dissolution provisions in
the existing LLC acts are modeled after the UPA, most LLC's will
automatically lack continuity of life.
The Service added support for that conclusion in Revenue Ruling
88-76.120 There, the Service ruled that a Wyoming LLC lacked con-
tinuity of life because it dissolved following the "death, resignation,
expulsion, bankruptcy, dissolution of a member or occurrence of any
other event that terminate[d] the continued membership of a member
of the company."' 2 ' The Service so held despite the ability of the re-
maining members to continue the business, if they so agreed.' 22 This
ruling is consistent with Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-2(b)(2),
which provides that an organization lacks continuity of life if under
local law the death or withdrawal of any member causes the organiza-
tion to dissolve, notwithstanding the privilege afforded its members to
continue the business by consent of the remaining members.23 Ap-
parently, the Treasury believes that the prospect of the remaining
members unanimously consenting to continue the business following
technical dissolution is too remote to be compared to a corporation's
unlimited life.
A recent Private Letter Ruling illustrates the importance of the
115. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(as amended in 1983).
116. Dissolution is defined as "an alteration of the identity of an organization by rea-
son of a change in the relationship between its members as determined under
local law." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)(as amended in 1983)(emphasis added).
117. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1)(as amended in 1983).
118. The Treasury Regulations refer to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, but add
that any references to that act apply equally to the RULPA. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a)(5)(as amended in 1983).
119. Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3)(amended in 1983).
120. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
121. The language of the other acts contains similar language. See supra section II.D.
122. See WYo. STAT. § 17-15-123(a)(iii)(1977). Generally, if the continued existence of
the entity is contingent on some stated event, it is unlikely that the entity has
continuity of life within the meaning of the Treasury Regulations. See eg., Lar-
son v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). In Larson, a limited partnership agreement
called for the partnership to terminate upon the "adjudication of bankruptcy of
the General Partner," id. at 175, but allowed the limited partners to elect a new
general partner by unanimous vote. The Tax Court held that the partnership
lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity of life, inter alia, because "such
contingent continuity of life did not resemble that of a corporation." Id
123. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)(as amended in 1983).
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requirement of unanimous agreement to continue the business of a
LLC after dissolution. In Private Letter Ruling 9010027124, the Ser-
vice held that a Florida LLC possessed continuity of life because its
Articles allowed the remaining members to continue the business fol-
lowing a member's death or withdrawal by only a majority vote (as
opposed to a unanimous vote). That provision may have violated Flor-
ida law which required unanimous consent of the remaining members
to continue the LLC, absent a "right to continue."'2 5 Nevertheless,
the ruling sheds considerable light on the Service's interpretation of
the language in Treasury Regulation Section 301.7701-2(b)(2).
The Service has not had the occasion to determine the effect of a
"right to continue" provision conclusively.w However, in three letter
rulings concerning partnership classification of Florida LLCs, the Ser-
vice specifically noted the absence of such a provision before conclud-
ing the LLC lacked continuity of life. 27 That notation creates a strong
implication that the Service would find continuity of life if a "right to
continue" provision were present. Furthermore, given that an LLC
with such a provision could continue indefinitely, that interpretation
appears correct. Thus, LLCs possessing a "right to continue" must
lack two of three remaining corporate characteristics in order to
achieve partnership classification. Absent a "right to continue," a
LLC will lack continuity of life.
B. Centralization of Management
As mentioned above, members may structure an LLC so that
elected managers operate the day-to-day business (mandatory in Colo-
rado). However, because the Treasury views centralized management
as a corporate characteristic, members must structure the LLC so that
election of managers does not have unintended income tax conse-
quences. For income tax purposes, an organization will possess cen-
tralized management "if any person (or any group of persons which
does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive authority
to make the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the
business for which the organization was formed."'128 Moreover, cen-
tralized management does not exist if the centralized authority is sub-
ject to ratification by the members of the organization,1 29 and if the
124. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9010027 (December 7,1989).
125. FLA. STAT. § 608.441(1)(c)(Supp. 1990)(emphasis added). The members can only
add provisions to the Articles that are "not inconsistent with the law." FLA.
STAT. § 608.407(1)(j)(Supp. 1990). Clearly then, where the statute expressly re-
quires unanimous consent, the members cannot substitute majority consent.
126. Only Florida and Kansas provide for such a statutory right, see supra section II.D.
127. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9030013 (April 25, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9029019 (April 9, 1990);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8937010 (June 16, 1989).
128. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1)(as amended in 1983).
129. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3)(as amended in 1983).
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powers and functions of the centralized body amounts to little more
than ministerial acts.130
In practice, the focus of inquiry has been on the representative
character of management, rather than its centralized structure.13 1
The Treasury Regulations reflect that emphasis: "Centralized man-
agement means a concentration of continuing exclusive authority to
make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization
... "132 The impetus behind adoption of that language was a barrage
of criticism received by the Treasury over proposed regulations which
would have effectively found centralized management in every limited
partnership. 3 3 Responding to that criticism, the Treasury added the
following language to section 301.7701-2(c)(4): "[L]imited partnerships
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, generally do not have centralized management, but centralized
management ordinarily does exist in such a limited partnership if sub-
stantially all the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited
partners."134
Under that standard, unless limited partners own "substantially
all" the interests in the organization (and thus, the general partners
own an insubstantial interest), the Treasury views the activities of the
general partners as primarily self-interested, and not representative in
character, i.e., the general partners will not resemble directors, acting
as representatives of stockholders. I3 While that language clearly nar-
130. Id-
131. See Zucluman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729, 738 (1975).
132. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3)(as amended in 1983).
133. 24 Fed. Reg. 10450. The proposed regulations essentially took the position that
because management of a limited partnership is concentrated in the hands of the
general partners, it would always possess centralized management. The criticism
of that view was that the Treasury had long recognized a distinction between
centralized management in the corporate sense and the limited partnership
sense, respectively. In the corporate setting, management is exercised in a repre-
sentative capacity. In a limited partnership, however, the general partners act
primarily out of their own interest, subject only to a fiduciary responsibility to
the other partners. Because income tax classification turns on the organization's
resemblance to a corporation, the focus must therefore be on the "representa-
tive," rather than the "centralized character of management. See Zuckman v.
United States, 524 F.2d 729 (1975).
134. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)(as amended in 1983).
135. Case law has also recognized a related characteristic of centralized management
in the context of limited partnerships. In Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159
(1976), the Tax Court held that a limited partnership possessed centralized man-
agement, not merely because the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the
general partner owned a "meaningful proprietary interest," but also because the
limited partner could remove the general partner. While such a power would
appear to shift the locus of power away from the general partners to the limited
partners, the court viewed the situation of the general partner as "not at all
analogous to the independent proprietary interest of the typical general partner."
Id at 178.
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rowed the instances in which centralized management may be found,
its use of the terms "ordinarily" and "substantially all" offers little
solace to the taxplanner.13 6
By analogy, the election of managers would not conclusively estab-
lish the existence of centralized management. Rather, the inquiry
would delve deeper into the ownership of the LLC. If the members
designate managers who are not also members, i.e., managers who
own no interest in the business, the organization will always possess
centralized management because it cannot be said that the managers
are acting in their own behalf. On the other hand, the opposite con-
clusion follows if the members opt to manage the business themselves
in proportion to their capital contributions, because no person will be
making decisions on behalf of the true owners.131 Awareness of those
two scenarios will be a useful planning tool because they add a known
factor to the classification analysis.
Regrettably, the test breaks down somewhat when the Articles
vest decision-making powers in managers who own an interest in the
LLC.138 In those situations, the same analysis used when classifying a
limited partnership would presumably apply; that is, the percentage
ownership of a managing member would be determinative. Ironically,
in a ruling billed as legitimizing partnership classification for LLCs,
the Service appeared to impose a stricter centralized management
standard on LLCs.139
In Revenue Ruling 88-76,140 the Service treated a Wyoming LLC as
136. There appears to be much uncertainty over what level of ownership will qualify
as "substantially all." The Tax Court has added more vague language to the anal-
ysis, finding a lack of centralized management when the general manager owns a
'"meaningful proprietary interest." Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159, 177 (1976).
This new language adds little to the analysis in the way of clarification. Perhaps
the best insight into how much is "substantially all" can be found in Revenue
Procedure 89-12, 1990-1 C.B. 798.
As stated earlier, that pronouncement states that the Service, as part of an
advanced ruling, will not hold that a limited partnership lacks centralized man-
agement if the limited partners own more than 80 percent. Again, Revenue Pro-
cedure 89-12 specifies only conditions for advanced rulings, and is not intended to
provide substantive rules for determination of partnership status. Nevertheless,
the 80 percent mark is a good measuring stick for investors planning to organize a
LLC because it sheds light on the level of ownership the Service considers
substantial.
137. This option is not available to the members of Colorado LLCs. See supra, section
II.B.
138. One commentator has suggested that members could ostensibly retain manage-
ment control but agree among themselves to centralize management decisions.
Comment, supra note 50, at 391. However, the Service will probably not accept
this form over substance solution given the Service's emphasis on the representa-
tive character of management, rather than the formal structure of the LLC. See
supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2, C.B. 360. See Hamill, supra note 54, at 723.
140. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2, C.B. 360.
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possessing centralized management after finding that the entity was
managed by designated managers (who also happened to be members).
If the Service reads this ruling literally, any LLC which designates
managers will automatically possess centralized management, not
withstanding the possibility that the managers could own a "meaning-
ful proprietary interest." 41 The Service could not have intended to
create such a double standard,142 given that it later announced parallel
advanced ruling requirements for limited partnerships and other enti-
ties seeking partnership classification. 4 3
Specifically, Revenue Procedure 89-12 section 4.06 provides that
the Service will not rule that a partnership lacks centralized manage-
ment 44 if the limited partners own more than eighty percent of the
total partnership interest. 4 5 Apparently, the more insignificant the
interest of the general partners, the greater the chance that the Ser-
vice will find centralized management. Because Revenue Procedure
89-12 applies to all entities seeking partnership classification, that
standard applies with equal force to LLCs.146
Thus, assuming the members desire to manage the business in
some measure, it may be wise to plan the LLC so that it will lack two
of the remaining three corporate characteristics. The corporate char-
acteristic of limited liability will be considered next.
C. Limited Liability
An organization possesses the corporate characteristic of limited
liability "if under local law there is no member who is personally lia-
ble' 4 7 for the debts of or claims against the organization.14 Further-
141. The Tax Court has stated that centralized management will not exist where the
general partners own a "meaningful proprietary interest" because they will be
acting in their own behalf and not in a representative capacity. Larson v.
Comrnm'r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
142. Limited partnerships are classified using the ownership test. See upmr notes 134-
36 and accompanying text.
143. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798. That Revenue Procedure purports to impose
the same requirements on all organizations seeking an advanced ruling on part-
nership classification, whether the business is a limited partnership or "any other
organization formed under a law that limits the liability of any member for the
organization's debts and other obligations to a determinable fixed amount." Idc
144. Failure to satisfy § 4.06 will only preclude a specific ruling that centralized man-
agement is lacking. Rev. Proc. 89-12,1989-1 C.B. 798. The entity may still obtain
partnership classification if it satisfies the remaining criteria of 89-12 and the
Treasury Regulations. IcE
145. Id. § 4.06. That arbitrary line is merely a ceiling, and the Service will also con-
sider "all facts and circumstances, including limited partner control of the gen-
eral partners (whether direct or indirect)." Id For LLCs, this indicates the
Service will consider the managers' rights and duties as provided in the statute,
regulations, and operating agreement, in addition to their ownership interests.
146. Rev. Proc. 89-12,1989-1 C.B. 798.
147. The Treasury Regulations provide that "[p]ersonal liability means that a creditor
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more, a member will have personal liability despite an agreement to
the contrary' 49 if under local law he remains liable to creditors. In the
case of partnerships organized under either the UPA and RULPA,150
general partners are personally liable. Thus, those entities will always
lack limited liability for federal income tax purposes.151
By contrast, neither the members nor the managers are liable for
LLC debts. Thus, it appears that an LLC will always possess the cor-
porate characteristic of limited liability. However, a blemish ap-
peared in the Treasury's otherwise crystal clear treatment of limited
liability. In its attempt to create a safe harbor for corporate general
partners of a limited partnership, the Service left open an avenue by
which certain qualifying LLCs could argue against limited liability.
Revenue Procedure 89-12 section 4.07 provides that if a corporate gen-
eral partner maintained a net worth equal to at least 10 percent of the
total contributions of the limited partnership, then, for advance ruling
purposes, the partnership would be treated as lacking limited liabil-
ity.152 Section 1.02 of that Revenue Procedure provides that: "Refer-
ences to 'general partners' ... apply also to comparable members of an
organization not designated as a partnership... [but seeking partner-
ship classification]; the general partners of such an organization will
ordinarily be those with significant management authority relative to
the other members."5 3
Arguably then, an LLC would similarly lack limited liability if a
of an organization may seek personal satisfaction from a member of the organiza-
tion to the extent that the assets of such organization are insufficient to satisfy
the creditor's claim-" Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1)(as amended in 1983).
148. Id.
149. Specifically, the regulations state: "[A]n agreement under which another person,
whether or not a member of the organization, assumes such liability or agrees to
indemnify such member for any such liability." Id.
150. The Treasury Regulations contain an exception for the personal liability of a gen-
eral partner in a limited partnership. Personal liability will not exist if the gen-
eral partner has no substantial assets and is merely a 'dummy' acting as the agent
of the limited partners." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2)(as amended in 1983).
However, this exception has apparently been rendered meaningless because of its
circular reasoning. See Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975). In
Zuckman the Court of Claims found that the Treasury Regulations mandate
that:
[Where the general partner of a limited partnership has no assets, only
two alternatives may follow- (1) if it is not a "dummy," then it is person-
ally liable; or (2) if it is a "dummy," then the limited partners for whom
it acts as agent and who in turn serve as its principal, are personally
liable. In either case, the limited partnership cannot have limited liabil-
ity, inasmuch as at least one of its "members"-whether general or lim-
ited-must at all times bear personal liability.
Id. at 741 (emphasis in original).
151. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1)(as Amended in 1983).
152. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
153. Rev. Proc. 89-12 § 1.02, 1989-1 C.B. 798.
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corporate manager sustained the requisite net worth. However, the
Service has corrected this flaw by rendering section 4.07 inapplicable
to LLCs.54 Thus, it appears quite clear that an LLC will always pos-
sess limited liability for purposes of federal income tax classification.
D. Free Transferability of Interests
The shares of stock of a corporation are, in theory, freely transfera-
ble by the owner without reference to the wishes of other members.155
Free transferability exists in an organization, for federal income tax
purposes, when "each of its members or those members owning sub-
stantially all of the interests in the organization have the power, with-
out the consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in the
same organization a person who is not a member of the organiza-
tion."'m However, substitution refers to a complete transfer of all the
attributes of the member's interest in the organization, 5 7 not merely
a right to share in the profits. 58
Unlike the regulations dealing with the other three corporate char-
acteristics discussed, Treasury Regulation section 301.7701-2(e) makes
no reference to either the presence or lack of free transferability of
interests in organizations formed under the UPA or RULPA. How-
ever, it is clear that interests in a partnership formed under the UPA
are not freely transferable because "[n]o person can become a member
of a partnership without the consent of all the partners."'5 9 It is less
clear in the case of entities organized under the RULPA.
Under the provisions of the RULPA, partnership interests are as-
signable in whole or in part. 60 However, the act grants partners the
ability to place restrictions on transferability in the partnership agree-
ment.i6 ' Thus, whether interests in limited partnerships are freely
transferable depends on the agreement of the partners. For LLCs, un-
less all members approve a proposed transfer, the transferee is enti-
tled only to share in the profits, and can exercise no voice in
management.16 2 Thus, an LLC always lacks free transferability. 63
In summary, an LLC will always possess limited liability, and al-
ways lack free transferability of interests. Hence, the federal income
tax classification of an LLC depends on whether it lacks either con-
154. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,798 (Oct. 18, 1989).
155. . HAmITON, CoRPoRATIoN INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LumED PARTNER-
sHis, at 134 (4th ed. 1990).
156. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1)(as amended in 1983).
157. I&
158. I
159. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g)(1914).
160. REVisED UNW. LTD. PARTNERsHIP ACT § 702 (1985).
161. IM at § 704(a)(i).
162. See supra section II.C.
163. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
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tinuity of life or centralized management. As discussed above, a LLC
may have centralized management unless its members chose to man-
age the business themselves. Further, a "right to continue" stated in
the Articles, will cause the LLC to possess continuity of life. Thus, an
LLC need only avoid those two obstacles to obtain partnership
.classification.
IV. UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING ACCEPTANCE OF THE
LLC'S LIMITED LIABILITY IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS
While the LLC's ability to achieve partnership status for federal
income tax purposes is now a settled matter, there remains uncer-
tainty over the limited liability it purports to offer its members. Spe-
cifically, commentators have expressed concern over whether foreign
jurisdictions (principally other states) will respect the LLC's limited
liability.164 To be sure, a number of cases suggest treatment of all un-
incorporated associations as general partnerships, despite the limited
liability those entities possess in their state of organization.165 How-
ever, developments in the laws of corporations and limited partner-
ships since those cases were decided arguably renders that approach
obsolete as to LLCs. The following discussion begins with a general
presumption in favor of deference to the laws of the state of
organization.
The general principle of comity requires that one state recognize
and admit operation within its jurisdiction, of the laws of another,
when not contrary to its own public policy.' 6 6 Specifically, the forum
state generally presumes that an entity, if not forbidden by its charter,
may exercise its powers within the forum state.16 7 That presumption
is rebuttable only by direct enactments or by the public policy of the
forum, as deduced from the general course of legislation or the settled
adjudications of its highest courts.168 In order to focus on policy con-
siderations, it will be assumed that no law exists which expressly for-
bids recognition of the limited liability of members of foreign entities,
or which requires the express permission of the state as a precondition
to the entity's recognition.
164. See Hamill, supra note 54, at 746; Comment, supra note 50, at 402.
165. Se4 e.g., Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907); Hollister v. McCamey,
115 Tex. 49,274 S.W. 562 (1925). Cf Goldwater v. Oltman, 210 Cal. 408,292 P. 624
(1930).
166. See Annotation, Personal Liability of Stockholder, Office or Agent for Debt of
Foreign Corporation Doing Business in the State, 27 AJL.R. 4th 387; RESTATF.
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1969).
167. See American & Foreign Christian Union v. Yount, 101 U.S. 352 (1879).
168. Id. at 356. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 6,295,
297 (1969)(concerning liability of limited partners and shareholders when busi-
ness is conducted in foreign jurisdictions).
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A. Policy of Creditor Protection
Because this country has seen little variation from state to state in
the types of business entities permitted by statute, case law illuminat-
ing the policy issues involved is scant. Commentators have used the
Texas case of Means v. Limpia Royalties 169 to demonstrate one state's
refusal, on policy grounds, to recognize an organization's limited liabil-
ity.170 In Means, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas allowed a pur-
chaser to rescind a contribution of Texas land to an Oklahoma
business trust, holding that, contrary to the representations of the pro-
moter and the law of Oklahoma the shareholders would be liable for
trust obligations created in Texas. However, beyond its holding the
court offered no explanation for Texas' policy, and asserted only that
its opinion was consistent with a long line of decisions.171
One of those earlier Texas cases provides some clarification. In
Wells v. Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co.,172 the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas held that shareholders of a Texas common law business trust
were liable as partners for trust debts despite a provision against per-
sonal liability in the declaration of trust. According to the court, per-
sons associated for the purpose of carrying on a business enterprise are
jointly and severally responsible unless the business is organized as a
limited partnership or corporation, or unless they specially contract
for limited liability. The court explained that:
The public in its dealings with such business organizations has a right to the
protection afforded them by our statutes regulating the formation of corpora-
tions. This protection would be greatly lessened if it should be held that by
declaring and recording a declaration of trust persons can associate them-
selves together for business purposes, giving their organization all the powers
of a corporation and limiting their individual liability, without complying with
statutes which require proof of the funds or assets of such an association
before a charter will be granted it to conduct its business.
17 3
Presumably, the court was speaking only of creditors when it used
the term "public." It would hardly be tenable to suggest that, by re-
fusing to recognize shareholder immunity from personal liability, the
court was protecting shareholder assets. Thus, this policy, at least in-
sofar as it has been articulated in Texas, assumes that corporation
laws protect creditors. However, even if protecting creditors is a legit-
imate policy, forcing investors to incorporate no longer furthers that
goal, assuming it ever did.
States now sanction corporations organized under laws that offer
little protection for creditors, and routinely recognize foreign corpora-
tions structured under similar laws. Perhaps the most notable change
169. 115 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
170. See e.g., August and Shaw, supra note 23, at 205; Comment, supra note 50, at 402.
171. Means v. Limpia Royalties, 115 S.W.2d 468, 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
172. 239 S.W. 1001 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
173. Id at 1007. See also Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907).
[Vol. 70:150
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
affecting creditor protection is the departure from the concept of par
value, and its related disclosures in the articles of incorporation.174
The concept of par value was originally designed, in part, to assure
creditors that a firm had incorporated with a miinimum level of capi-
ta.s7 5 But it actually increased creditor risk after corporations began
issuing watered stock.176 Moreover, in those states retaining par value
corporations have emasculated any disclosure value by issuing nomi-
nal par shares (e.g. one cent, ten cents, or one dollar). 7 7 Conse-
quently, the only real protection offered to creditors by present
corporation laws is a limitation on distributions to shareholders. 7 8
States will find it difficult to use the policy of creditor protection to
deny members limited liability because LLCs impose similar distribu-
tional limitations.
Corporation laws generally leave creditors to fend for themselves
because, in most circumstances, creditors are in a position to do so. A
voluntary creditor, because of an existing contractual relationship, can
simply require compensation for any assumed risk as a term of the
contract.179 Thus, in the usual situation the choice between limited
liability or unlimited liability has less to do with equity, and more to
do with economic efficiency. 8 0 While these economic efficiencies may
be less pronounced in closely held corporations (and presumably any
closely held entity),'s' the pervasiveness of the close corporation is
compelling evidence that, at least for some small entities, limited lia-
bility is an efficient rule. Accordingly, at least insofar as protection of
174. About 15 states have followed the RMBCA's lead and entirely abandoned the
concept of par value. See R. HAMuLTON, supra note 155, at 308. In most of the
remaining states, the articles of incorporation must state either the par value of
the shares of each class or that the shares are issued '"ith no par value" or '%vith-
out par value." I& See, eg., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 403(2)(A)(2)(1981)
(shareholders may opt out of par value). CY NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2052(4)(Reis-
sue 1987)(par value state).
175. R. HAMiLTON, supra note 155, at 308.
176. Id. at 309.
177. In addition to rendering the disclosure requirement useless, corporations that is-
sue nominal par shares achieve greater flexibility in making distributions to
shareholders because more capital will be classified as surplus, and thus available
for distribution. Id. at 315. Hence, creditors cannot rely solely on capital as a
means of payment. Instead, most creditors require some form of collateral on
certain business assets to secure their claims.
178. See, eg., REvisED MODEL BusmEss CORP. Aar § 6.40 (1985). But see supra notes
176-77 and accompanying text (discussing impairment of protection offered by
limitations on distributions caused by use of nominal par shares).
179. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52
U. Cm. L. REv. 89 (1985); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis
of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117 (1980); Manne,
supra note 15; Meiners, Mofsky, & Tollison, supra note 28; Posner, The Rights of
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 499 (1976).
180. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 179, at 93.
181. Id. at 109-10.
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voluntary creditors is concerned, there appears to be no policy reason
to deny businessmen an alternative to corporations beyond limited
partnerships.
The basis for that conclusion, as stated above, is that limited liabil-
ity is merely a default rule capable of being contracted around, and as
such finds its justification in economic efficiency. Of course, such a
judgment presumes that the creditor has sufficient information to
evaluate the added risk, and require advance compensation. But what
about where creditors either have bad information because of a mem-
ber's misrepresentation, or are unable to bargain for advance compen-
sation because they are involuntary creditors? For the reasons
discussed below, the judiciaries of foreign jurisdictions should only im-
pose personal liability in the limited circumstances where the corpo-
rate veil is pierced.
The threat of misrepresentation is equally prevalent where corpo-
rations are involved. For example, a subsidiary corporation could use
a name deceptively similar to its parent company, leading unsophisti-
cated creditors into reasonably believing they were dealing with the
parent company.18 2 Another possible scenario is where the creditor is
misled into believing the risk of default is lower than it actually is,
causing the creditor to demand less compensation.18 3 Or, a more
analogous scenario for LLCs is where a major shareholder orally rep-
resents that she will make good on a corporate debt, but shields her-
self from liability with the statute of frauds and parole evidence
rule.l84 These types of conduct result in creditors assuming an exces-
sive amount of risk.
Limited liability imposes a similar hazard on involuntary creditors
(usually tort claimants), but for an entirely different reason. Tort
claimants assume added risk because they cannot bargain for advance
compensation.185 However, despite the potential for uncompensated
risk, courts have responded not by stating a public policy against cor-
porate limited liability, but rather by piercing the corporate veil in
particular cases involving misrepresentation and involuntary credi-
tors.lss Thus, for LLCs, the question is whether they pose a suffi-
ciently greater threat to creditors than do corporations such that
states should treat LLCs differently.
The answer to that question is of course empirical. However, based
182. Posner, supra note 179, at 521.
183. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 179, at 112.
184. See, e.g., Dewitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray Fleming Truck Co., 540 F.2d 681 (1976).
185. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 179, at 112; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 179, at 145-47.
186. Easterbrook & Fischel recommend several alternative methods for decreasing
the incentive created by limited liability to engage in overly risky activities. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 179, at 114-16.
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on experience in corporation law, commentators have suggested that
small entities with less capital to lose are more likely to engage in
risky conduct. Despite this added risk states do not deny shareholders
of close corporations limited liability as a matter of course, or even
raise a presumption against it. Rather, courts examine the adequacy
of capitalization as a factor in deciding whether to pierce the corporate
veil on a case-by-case basis. Given that LLCs probably have no greater
incentive to undercapitalize than do close corporations, there appears
to be no policy reason to treat LLCs differently. Creditor protection
under the ULPA and RULPA is discussed in the following section.
B. Policy Against Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law
Prior to enactment of the ULPA, courts often refused to recognize
the immunity of limited partners of defectively formed limited part-
nerships on the ground that under such circumstances limited liability
derogated from the common law. In response, the drafters of the
ULPA adopted provisions, and a general policy, designed to grant lim-
ited partners the same sense of security from personal liability as
shareholders of corporations. 8 7 More recently, the RULPA bolstered
that position with even stronger protection for limited partners. Ar-
guably, the policies embodied in those acts (as adopted in every state)
apply equally well to LLCs, and therefore foreclose treatment of
members as general partners.
The chief provision of the ULPA gives a person who erroneously
believes that she has become a limited partner of a limited partnership
an opportunity to withdraw her interest under certain circumstances,
and not be held liable as a general partner. 8 8 However, that provision
flatly defies a line of common law authority requiring any person
sharing in an enterprise's profits to likewise be liable for its losses.18 9
Hence, to be clear about their objectives the drafters added the rule of
construction that: "The rule that statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this
article."1 90
The ULPA's disagreement with the common law authority appears
fundamental and straightforward:
The act proceeds on the assumption that no public policy requires a person
187. Lewis, sumra note 1, 723.
188. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHm ACr § 7 (1916).
189. The parent cases creating that doctrine were Grace v. Smith, 2 Wn. Blackstone
998 (1775) and Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Blackstone 235 (1793). The other line of
authority holds that, while the right to participate in profits affords cogent evi-
dence that a partnership exists, the real test is whether an agency relationship is
present Cox v. Hickman, 8 House of Lords Cases 268 (1860). It is needless to
explore the ancient circumstances for the two lines. Rather, our focus is properly
on how current developments render that analysis moot.
190. UuiF. LTD. PARTNERsIP Aar § 28 (1916).
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who contributes to the capital of a business, acquires an interest in the profits,
and some degree of control over the conduct of the business, to become bound
for the obligation of the business, provided creditors have no reason to believe
at the times their credits were extended that such person was so bound.1 9 1
That statement refers to any. "person", not simply to limited part-
ners. Accordingly, based only on that policy statement, states adopt-
ing the ULPA should find it equally acceptable for members of LLCs
to retain their limited liability when the LLC transact within the
state's boundaries, so long as the LLCs do not mislead creditors into
believing members will be personally liable. However, to some extent
that policy assumption is inconsistent with the actual ULPA provision
governing liability of limited partners which imposes liability if the
limited partner partakes in control of the business, regardless of any
reliance.192
In practice, courts have found it difficult to determine when lim-
ited partners cross the "control" line.193 Perhaps some of the courts'
trouble stems from the inequity of granting a windfall to creditors
who simply assume they are dealing with a particular type without
performing a reasonable investigation. Gilman Paint & Varnish Co.
v. Legum 194 reflects that concern. In Legum, a trade creditor who was
unaware that he was dealing with a limited partnership attempted to
hold a limited partner personally liable. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland rejected the creditor's assertion, however, on the ground
that the limited partner had made no misrepresentation of his status
to the creditor. Indeed, Legum involved a partner who, unlike a man-
aging member of a LLC, had not exercised management control.
However, the court did not depend on that fact in reaching its decision.
The court underscored that "[the creditor] cannot assume that his
prospective purchaser is necessarily a corporation or a partnership of
the state where the order is to be sent."'195 Rather, according to the
court, a creditor must inquire as to the type of business to which it is
extending credit.19 6 Arguably, the court would have come to the same
conclusion if the defendant had been a member of a LLC despite man-
aging the business, because a reasonable investigation of the law
would disclose member limited liability. This represents sound policy,
both on grounds of equity and in light of the assumption embodied in
the ULPA.197 The RULPA also appears to have endorsed this policy.
The RULPA shields limited partners from personal liability de-
191. Commissioner's note to the UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHmp ACr § 6 (1916).
192. 197 Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951); see UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSIP ACT § 7 (1916).
193. See Commissioner's comment to REvIsED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303
(Supp. 1991).
194. Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951).
195. Id. at 668, 80 A.2d at 907.
196. I at 668, 80 A.2d at 907-08.
197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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spite participation in the control of the business, so long as the limited
partner's conduct does not cause the creditor to reasonably believe
that the limited partner was actually a general partner. 98 Thus, it
appears that in the thirty four states which have adopted the RULPA,
limited liability and assumption of management duties are not inher-
ently incompatible. Arguably then, absent any misrepresentation the
judiciary in those states should not object to LLCs combining the same
concepts, given the LLC's resemblance to a partnership. 9 9 For LLCs
operating in the remaining states which follow the ULPA, member
status is much less certain because of the gap between the language of
the act's policy assumption and its actual liability provision. While the
duty to inquire recognized by the Legum court should bridge that gap,
there is no assurance that other jurisdictions, or even the high court of
Maryland, will agree.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
LLCs offer businessmen an alternative to corporations and part-
nerships for conducting their business affairs by combining the advan-
tages of partnership taxation and limited liability. Following a period
of years when the income tax status of the LLC was considerably in
doubt, its ability to achieve partnership status now appears to be a set-
tled matter. Moreover, while some question persists about the LLC's
capacity to retain its limited liability while transacting in foreign juris-
dictions, state acceptance of corporation laws that offer little protec-
tion to creditors, and state adoption of either the ULPA and RULPA
with their corresponding policy of reliance, should give members a
compelling argument in favor of limited liability.
Sylvester J. Orsi '92
198. REvisED UNE. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303 (1985).
199. See supra section H.
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